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FOREWORD
Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan remind
U.S. policymakers of the tremendous obstacles and
challenges that confront states as they attempt to
install liberal, democratic political institutions. The
multifaceted transition process involves a host of
overlapping and interrelated political, economic, and
social innovations that often must be tailored to the
specific historical, demographic, and regional needs
of each community. While it would be presumptuous
to suggest any rigid schedule or set of priorities, most
scholars and policymakers agree that restructuring
the security and civil-military institutions is vital to
the transition. West Germany’s and South Africa’s
experiences illustrate the intricate complexities and
numerous considerations that factor into this process
and provide some important lessons for the future.
This monograph analyzes the decisionmaking
process behind the construction of German and South
African armed forces in their transition to democracy.
Dr. Jack Porter begins the study by outlining the
central theoretical and practical challenges associated
with designing democratic armed forces and civilmilitary institutions. In essence, the overriding goal
for these communities is two-fold: the creation of
military institutions that are capable of both defending
the fledgling democracy from internal and external
threats, while also proactively contributing to the
consolidation of liberal democracy. Building on the
civil-military classics of Samuel Huntington and
Morris Janowitz, Dr. Porter then reviews recent case
studies that focus on the efforts of post-communist
states to democratize their armed forces. A brief
discussion of the relatively new policy field of security
sector reform (SSR) concludes the introduction.
iii

When West German political leaders decided to
remilitarize the former fascist state in the late 1940s,
they were confronted by the twin objectives identified
above. Initially, the primary obstacle centered on
designing a new military in a manner best suited to
contribute to the defensive needs associated with
the emerging Cold War struggle against the Soviet
Union. If this were not complicated enough, defense
planners understood that any effort to rearm had to
be done in a way that assuaged the justifiable fears of
domestic critics and suspicious neighbors. The solution involved a complex set of civil-military institutions
whose purpose also included the consolidation and
transmission of democratic, liberal ideals first to
members of the Bundeswehr, and later to the rest of the
newly free political community.
Emerging from decades of authoritarian rule and
increased domestic violence, South Africa found itself
facing very similar ordeals in the early 1990s. As Dr.
Porter demonstrates, both white and black leaders
sought to create new democratic armed forces that
were professional and accountable to civilian authorities. Furthermore, in order to assure South Africans of
all backgrounds that these forces would not disrupt the
fragile transition, numerous military, legal, and political institutions were developed. For example, recruitment and promotion policies emphasized the formation
of a representative armed forces composed of all racial
groups. Also, in an effort to enhance transparency
and trust, defense planning was made accessible to a
wide spectrum of government and nongovernmental
organizations.
Finally, the monograph concludes with a brief list
of policy recommendations for future efforts geared at
democratizing formerly authoritarian armed forces.
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While Dr. Porter acknowledges the limitations of
his comparative analysis, he nonetheless argues that
important lessons can be gleaned from the experiences
of West Germany and the Republic of South Africa.
Perhaps most significant, the analysis demonstrates
the tremendous contribution that the armed forces
can provide for communities as they struggle towards
security and freedom.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
“Rogue” and “failed” states present numerous
security challenges to the United States and the rest
of the international community. Not only do these
states offer refuge and at times assistance to violent
nonstate actors such as terrorist organizations and
pirate syndicates, their continued inability to respond
to citizens’ needs and unwillingness to respect human
dignity establish the foundations for ongoing regional
and global instability. With this challenge in mind,
current U.S. and international foreign and security
policy is directed at assisting these fragile communities
in their efforts at democratic state and nation-building.
The primary focus of this analysis is a detailed examination of two earlier and successful efforts at
democratization—the Federal Republic of Germany
and South Africa—paying particular attention to
the role of civil-military institutions. After outlining
the substantial theoretical and practical obstacles
confronting these states, the monograph highlights the
potential roles that the new armed forces can play in
the democratic transition and consolidation phases.
The analysis concludes with a number of policy
recommendations and suggestions for those involved
in these formidable and critical efforts.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS
IN STATE AND NATION-BUILDING
IN WEST GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
With their first apparently successful democratic
elections behind them, the future Afghan and Iraqi
governments must now refocus their attention on the
construction and consolidation of legitimate political,
economic, and social institutions. Both the shortterm authority and effectiveness of the representative
government hinge directly on the development of these
institutions and the extent to which they are regarded
as reasonably efficient in satisfying the core needs of
Afghan and Iraqi citizens.
Long-term authority, however, is another matter
altogether; one that depends, in part, on the formation
of a robust civil society. This is a tall order to say the
least. Nonetheless, the challenge of state-building is not
new to post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) Afghanistan or
post-2003 Iraq. Significantly, these and other fledgling
liberal democracies will not be forced to approach these
formidable challenges on their own and instead can
count on varying levels of assistance from the United
States and the international community.
If the development of representative political
institutions and free market economic structures
and the formation of a sense of nationhood (“wefeeling”) were not demanding enough, both nascent
democracies must confront significant internal and
external threats to their states’ security. Certainly,
much has been written recently about the creation,
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training, and expansion of the Iraqi security forces and
their proposed vital role in combating the increasingly
violent insurgency. Although less publicized (at least
until recently), similar efforts are also underway in
Afghanistan.
With this in mind, the objective of this monograph
is to briefly analyze how civil-military institutions were
designed in post-World War II Germany and postApartheid South Africa, with particular attention to
their contribution to state and nation-building. Clearly,
numerous international and unit level differences
preclude drawing too many direct conclusions from
this analysis. Nonetheless, I argue that important
similarities exist and may assist policymakers in their
efforts, as well as advance our understanding of the
complicated and multifaceted decisionmaking process
behind the creation of civil-military institutions.
This monograph is organized as follows. First
is a brief introduction of a theoretical approach to
civil-military relations. Second, the post-apartheid
restructuring of the South African National Defence
Force (SANDF), 1994-2000, and the creation of the
Bundeswehr, 1949-56, are analyzed. Following these
case studies, some of the implications of these two
experiences for the current efforts at reconstruction in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere are discussed. Finally, a short conclusion on some of the unfinished
business and possible pitfalls of these efforts is presented.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
The purpose of the previous introduction is to
remind us of the ongoing efforts to combat and address
the potentially violent consequences of “failed” or
“rogue” states. The first step was clearly the removal of
2

the outlaw regimes and the stabilization of the political,
economic, and social conditions in each country.
Following this admittedly enormous and unfinished
task, plans called for select indigenous political actors
to write a new constitution and craft a comprehensive
set of domestic institutions based on the principles of
representative democracy.
With reference to Afghanistan, a constitutional
conference was held in January 2004, followed by
democratic elections on October 9, 2004. In Iraq, a
transitional government was elected in January 2005.
Subsequently, Iraq’s constitution was approved by
public referendum in October 2005, followed by
democratic elections in December. By May 2006, elected Iraqi officials had formed a unified government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki.
While future schedules inevitably remain tentative and subject to a host of domestic and international factors, it is critical to investigate how these
democratizing states might organize their civilmilitary relations. In fact, American and coalition
military advisors are currently organizing and training
core groups of Afghanis and Iraqis for service in their
countries’ new national armed forces.
To date, the primary focus of the training has
understandably been geared toward assistance with
the stabilization operations.1 Much less attention,
however, has been paid to how the national military
will be organized after the bulk of the coalition troops
depart.2
Furthermore, since liberal democracy is new to
both of these countries, one cannot underestimate the
importance of designing robust and legitimate civilmilitary institutions. At a minimum, constitutional
provisions, as well as governmental and military
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procedures, must be established so that the new
national military is incapable and unwilling to attempt
to impose its will on the fledgling government.
In addition, the national military must be capable of
managing the country’s core security needs. For much
of the civil-military literature, these two goals, a military force capable of responding to internal and external threats, yet unwilling or unable to disproportionately influence the civilian leadership, remain
the core requirements of democratic civil-military
relations.
Yet as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate,
civil-military relations and military institutions have
been designed with more proactive objectives in mind.
More specifically, as West Germany and South Africa
emerged from pariah status, both states’ decisionmakers explicitly designed their national militaries to
satisfy the concerns outlined above, as well as promote
democratic values and new conceptions of nationhood.
James Burk recently argued that current theories
on civil-military relations might, in fact, be inadequate,
particularly with reference to mature democracies.3 In
an explicitly normative approach, Burk returns to two
of the classical theoretical treatments of civil-military
relations: Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the
State4 and Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier.5
His objective is to elaborate, “a normative theory that
helps us understand how civil-military relations sustain
and protect democratic values.”6 While a number of
other theorists are discussed in his article, Burk asserts
that it is important to revisit these two seminal works
to underscore a few, yet critical, shortcomings in the
civil-military literature. According to Burk, despite
the fact that these books were written over 40 years
ago, they continue to frame much of the scholarship
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to date. For the purposes of this analysis, I too believe
that it is helpful to reflect on Huntington and Janowitz.
Although my subject is the investigation of civilmilitary institutions in newly emerging democratic
states, I intend to demonstrate that the theoretical
approaches continue to be relevant.
Running the risk of oversimplification, the primary
focus of Huntington’s analysis is to generate a theory
that explains the capacity of states, including liberal
democracies such as the United States, to structure
their civil-military relations in a manner that most effectively enables the armed forces to defend the state from
external (and internal) threats and enemies. Obviously,
in democracies the military must be subject to the
control of legitimate civilian authorities. According
to Huntington, the solution lies in the establishment
of “objective civilian control.” Civilian authorities
are responsible for devising national security goals
and objectives, while the military, as an apolitical
professional organization, has the responsibility for
determining the specific details required for their
realization.
Objective civilian control achieves its end by
militarizing the military, making them the tool of the
state. Subjective civilian control exists in a variety
of forms, objective civilian control in only one. The
antithesis of objective civilian control is military
participation in politics: civilian control decreases
as the military become progressively involved in
institutional, class, and constitutional politics.7

Beyond the importance of the professional ethic,
however, Huntington pays little attention to how
officers and soldiers develop and maintain their
ideological beliefs under a system of objective civilian
control. To be fair, he does stress that civilian control
5

depends on the extent to which the political ideology
of a state is consistent with the military ethic. Some
ideologies, for example fascism, Marxism, and
liberalism, are not compatible with the military ethic.
Thus, “(t)he realization of objective civilian control
thus depends upon the achievement of an appropriate
equilibrium between the power of the military and
the ideology of society.”8 With reference to the United
States (the only mature democracy in Huntington’s
study), the liberal ideology, a conservative constitution, and geographic isolation are factors that have
inhibited the development of objective civilian control.
Furthermore, the military was able to develop a
professional ethic only when it was virtually excluded
from political power.9 Once again, Huntington’s
concern is the defense of democracy through a robust
military profession and objective civilian control, not
the ideological inclinations of officers and soldiers.
Janowitz addresses this last point. More interested
in the social and ideological character of American
officers, his analysis is primarily concerned with how
recent changes in technology and warfare have eroded
the distinction between soldier and civilian. The
division of labor between military leaders and political leaders has also become much more obscure. Military traditionalism is increasingly influenced by the
flow of civilians into military organization. Simultaneously, military leaders are engaging in a
widening array of political or nonmilitary functions;
including diplomatic missions, foreign assistance and
advisory roles, and domestic political responsibilities.
Responding to these changes, Janowitz discusses
in great detail a new direction for the U.S. Armed
Forces. The key to his plan—a constabulary force—
is to make sure that there is an appropriate balance
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between three types of officers: military managers,
technical specialists, and heroic fighters. As warfare
becomes more specialized and complex, old patterns
of command based on authoritarianism and strict
hierarchy are being replaced by command techniques
of manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. In
contemporary circumstances, soldiers need to know
whom they are fighting for and why. They cannot
simply be commanded to fulfill some basic function.
Instead, initiative at all levels of command becomes
vital to success.
Due to the increased reliance on initiative and
morale, Janowitz emphasized the importance of the
changing social composition, political inclinations,
and education of the American officer corps. As he
put it, “The politics of the professional soldier has
become the politics of an organization—of a pressure
group—rather than the mere expression of the interest
of a social stratum.”10 Unlike Huntington, Janowitz
is skeptical that democracy can be defended and
sustained solely through the professionalization of the
military and objective civilian control. In fact, much
more is required. In addition to his idea of organizing
the American Armed Forces as a constabulary force, a
thorough reorganization must be pursued, particularly
regarding the formal and informal ties between the
military and civilian policymakers and Congress. Of
importance is Janowitz’s sociological argument in
favor of continuous political and civic education for
military personnel.
Bold experimentation in the political education of the
officer corps is also required. It is impossible to isolate
the professional soldier from domestic political life,
and it is undesirable to leave the tasks of political
education completely to the professionals themselves,

7

even though they have been highly responsible in
this assignment. The goal of political education is
to develop a commitment to the democratic system
and an understanding of how it works (emphasis
added). Even though this task must rest within
the profession itself, it is possible to conceive of a
bipartisan contribution of the political parties.11

Janowitz’s remarks bring us back to Burk’s assertion that while the literature on civil-military relations
is vast, it remains limited and fails to take into account
significant changes in the international system and
how military forces are deployed. For the most part, this
literature focuses predominantly on the relationship of
the military to civilian authorities. While Huntington
lays out the core idea of civil-military relations as a
means by which states, including democracies, can
protect themselves from external threats, Janowitz
emphasizes the other side of civil-military institutions,
a means by which democracies and their militaries can
maintain themselves. According to Burk,
They treat different parts of the problem that a
democratic theory of civil-military relations must
confront, either how to protect or how to sustain
democratic values. Notice that to protect democratic
values the military needs to be subordinate to civilian
power, but not necessarily to enact democratic values
as it goes about its work. To sustain democratic
values, the military must in crucial respects identify
substantively with and so embody the values of the
society it defends. Ideally, one theory would explain
how to do both.12

As indicated earlier, my analysis seeks to address
Burk’s concern. Although it is premature to claim that
I have a well-developed theory that satisfactorily explains how democracies address these twin challenges,
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I do hope that the forthcoming investigation will help
us think more systematically about these issues. Also,
I recognize that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan is anywhere close to being categorized as a mature
democracy, let alone a stable political system. Both
countries are in the reconstruction phase; political and
military institutions are in their infancy. Nonetheless,
I believe that this is all the more reason to pay detailed
attention to how these vital structures are initially
designed. Also, I am conscious of the immediate
security and economic demands on both of these
countries, (not to mention persistent ethnic, religious,
and regional divisions) and certainly do not argue that
these challenges and factors can be ignored or slighted.
With this in mind, what the following two cases,
post-Nazi West Germany and post-Apartheid South
Africa, will demonstrate is that civil-military institutions have been designed to simultaneously accomplish the two objectives—defending the emerging
liberal, democratic state from internal and external
threats, and concomitantly promoting a new
democratic political culture, civilian control of military
institutions, and national unity.13
Domestically, military institutions contribute to
political legitimacy, expose and educate new generations to the new political ideas and values, and act
as a signal to important domestic constituencies as to
the democratic, pluralistic character of the new political
regime and community. Internationally, the particular
institutional design of the military demonstrates that
the state will be able to defend itself (while not threatening its neighbors), credibly contribute to regional security, and also act as an important signaling mechanism
to its neighbors of its character or type (trustworthy,
democratic, and responsible). In this way, the decisions
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on civil-military institutions are vital mechanisms for
joining the regional multilateral institutions and the
international community of democratic states. I will
return to these ideas after the detailed case studies.
Before turning to the case studies, it is worth noting
that some very important efforts have been made in
addressing the theoretical and practical challenges
associated with the construction of democratic civilmilitary institutions. In particular, scholars and
policymakers have offered detailed analysis of the
transition of former communist militaries after the
end of the Cold War. Among other subjects, the
investigations focused broadly on the development
of professional soldiers, their relationship to the
emerging pluralist societies, and the institutional and
legal relationship to civilian authority. In addition to
this regional focus, a policy-oriented area of interest
called “security sector reform” has been created that
addresses many of the concerns associated with the
field of civil-military relations.
Regarding the transition of post-communist
militaries, the three-volume study edited by Anthony
Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey,
provides perhaps the most thorough investigation of
these countries’ defense policies.14 Each of the volumes
deals with a different aspect of the development of
professional armed forces: the establishment and
maintenance of civilian control of the military, the
definition of professionalism and progress made by
the various post-communist countries towards this
ideal, and finally the multifaceted relationship between
the armed forces and society at large, with special
attention to the establishment of long-term legitimacy
for these states’ militaries. Whereas time and space
considerations preclude an exhaustive treatment of
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these extremely insightful studies, they nonetheless
make important conceptual contributions towards the
field of civil-military relations by providing clarity
on such diverse topics as to why certain states design
certain types of armed forces, the potential functions
these institutions are expected to perform (both
internally and externally), and the many variables that
influence these tough policy choices.
The first of the three volumes, Democratic Control
of the Military in Post-communist Europe: Guarding the
Guards,15 begins with an outline of the communist
legacies facing the countries in this region. In most
cases, the militaries were highly politicized and
had a certain degree of autonomy when it came to
the development and implementation of defense
policy. In exchange for this independence, the armed
forces were subject to “strong and direct” civilian
control and were not directly involved in domestic
politics.16 Interestingly, these factors both facilitated
and confounded subsequent efforts at establishing
democratic civilian control. The authors also provide
a three-part definition of civilian control: the military
should be an apolitical servant of the democratic
government, defense policy should be under the control
and direction of civilian authorities, and decisions
regarding the use and deployment of the armed forces
also resides with the civilian leadership. Finally, the
volume discusses the relative progress made to date
in the various countries and the numerous factors
(historical legacies; political, economic, and social
factors; international considerations; and institutional
and military cultural conditions) that influence the
development of civil-military relations.
The second volume, The Challenge of Military Reform
in Post-communist Europe: Building Professional Armed
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Forces,17 addresses issues related to the development
of professional soldiers in this region. According
to the authors, professionalism should be seen as a
normative concept involving a dynamic process rather
than a static description. Further, professional armed
forces display four core characteristics: clearly defined
roles that are understood by soldiers and societies,
expertise in their areas of responsibility, clear rules
regarding their institution and responsibilities, and
promotions based on merit and achievement.18 Also,
there are four professional military types consistent
with the above criteria but involving different roles—
power projection, territorial defense (capable of
participation in multinational missions), post-neutral
(national defense, lightly armed and reliant on mass
mobilization), and neutral (same as post-neutral
but NO capability for international peacekeeping,
etc.).19 The choice of professional military type and
progress made towards professionalism in the various
post-communist countries are a function of both
international and domestic level variables. Relevant
to the following case studies on West Germany and
South Africa, the volume concludes that the patterns
of professionalism are driven by both military and
political imperatives, not just the logic of the security
environment.20 The last of the volumes, Soldiers and
Societies in Post-communist Europe: Legitimacy and
Change,21 deals with the sociological aspects of the
transition to democratic civil-military control. More
specifically, the editors and authors of the case studies
attempt to analyze various relationships between
the state, society, and the armed forces. Ultimately,
the goal is the creation and maintenance of armed
forces that are regarded as legitimate by members
of society. Furthermore, legitimacy is a product of
the functional and socio-political imperatives that
12

the institutions are expected to perform.22 Five ideal
types of military roles are identified: national security,
nation-builder, regime defense, domestic military
assistance, and military diplomacy. Certainly these
roles are not mutually exclusive; in fact, many of the
post-communist militaries perform a number of these
tasks, and “there are inevitable and obvious links and
cross-overs between certain functions within these
categories.”23 As will be demonstrated in the following
case studies, a variety of international factors (threat
perception, international assistance, and technological
development) as well as domestic conditions (history,
domestic politics, and economic constraints) influences
each country’s policy choices.
In addition to these there works on post-communist
armed forces, a policy-related discipline called “security sector reform” (SSR) has emerged, within which
the field of civil-military relations plays a prominent
role. SSR is multidisciplinary. Its focus goes beyond
purely defense and military considerations and,
instead, SSR is intended to develop theoretical and
practical solutions to the (re)construction of legal,
social, and military institutions accompanying the
transition to democracy and rule of law. In addition
to more peaceful transitions, the field is concerned
with the construction of new security institutions in
post-conflict societies, particularly those that involve
multilateral peacebuilding operations.24 Succinctly,
SSR is primarily concerned with establishing the rule
of law and includes,
actors directly involved in protecting civilians and
the state from violent harm (e.g., police and military
forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions
that govern these actors (ministries of interior,
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defense, and justice; and national security councils),
and oversight bodies.25

While extremely useful, particularly in the cases of
Iraq and Afghanistan, SSR focuses on a much more
extensive set of issues than is covered in this analysis.
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1994-2000
In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party assumed
power in South Africa and embarked on a political,
legal, economic, and social project designed at its
core to perpetuate White rule and privilege. While
antithetical to emerging (nascent) international norms
of racial equality, the racist system of Apartheid was
not initially the target of international condemnation.
Furthermore, for at least 2 decades, the system
functioned relatively efficiently for the vast majority
of Whites in South Africa, and an omnipresent and
increasingly repressive internal security apparatus
ensured that domestic opposition would remain
unproductive.
Nonetheless, as domestic resistance and international antagonism mounted and increasingly apparent economic inefficiencies led more and more
Whites to question the logic of the system, Apartheid’s cracks grew.26 By the early 1990s, many prominent White South African leaders realized that the
system was ready to collapse. Fearing internal and
regional chaos and perhaps an expanded, more violent
civil war, the ruling government of F. W. de Klerk
decided to make peace with the African National
Congress (ANC) and other enemies and negotiate a
nonviolent end to Apartheid. The White South African
monopoly on political power would have to come to
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an end. After detailed negotiations, free elections were
held for the first time in April 1994. Nelson Mandela
was elected president, ushering in a new era in South
African politics.
Although avoiding civil war, South Africa remained a divided and extremely unequal society. During
Apartheid, South African society was officially divided
into four racial groups: White, Colored, Indian, and
African. The extensive tangle of laws and restrictions
were designed to keep the various groups “apart”—
socially, politically, and economically. In many respects, the system was quite successful. Not only did
Whites maintain a virtual monopoly of political power;
economically and educationally, Whites also benefited
disproportionately.
In 1994, the United Nations Human Development Program ranked South Africa 90th out of 175
countries.27 Of significance,
The judiciary, bureaucracy, army, police force, and
municipal administrations were all dominated by
white men who had been brought up in a racist
milieu and had been trained to serve the Apartheid
state. The country had one of the greatest gaps in
the world between rich and poor, and although new
multiracial classes were forming, the gap marked
primarily a division between races.28

These lamentable conditions were what awaited
Nelson Mandela and his Government of National
Unity (GNU) when he took the presidential oath on
May 10, 1994. In addition to improving the living
standards of the majority of South Africans, the
Mandela government also had to address the fact
that the country remained a fractured and suspicious
nation. Formulating a new constitution, coming to
terms with past human rights abuses through the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and economic
15

redevelopment and redistribution were only a few
of the strategies employed for the purposes of democratic transition. Another part of the transformation
agenda was the creation of a new South African
military.
Negotiations between leaders of the Apartheidera South African Defence Force (SADF) and the Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK (the “Spear of the Nation,”
the military wing of the ANC) began in 1991. Both
sides had a common interest in trying to manage this
aspect of the transition process. In addition to these
two groups, there were at least six other nonstatutory
military organizations involved in the struggle.
Nonstatutory Forces (NSF) included the Homeland
Defence Forces of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutatswana,
and Venda (Bantustans), and two other liberation
armies, the Azanian National Liberation Army
(AZANLA) and the APLA (the military wing of the
Azanian Peoples Organization [AZAPO] and the Pan
African Congress [PAC]). In initiating both informal,
and later formal, talks, the SADF and MK negotiators’
primary goal was to manage the growing internal
violence and prevent the eruption of a more extensive
civil war. By excluding the other forces from the
negotiations, the two also hoped to avoid complications
and ensure that their concerns dominated the process,
even at the expense of the other groups.29
As noted, negotiations commenced at approximately the same time as the more celebrated political
discussions between de Klerk and Mandela. Yet the
two sets of negotiations were clearly linked. As the
civilian leaders devised the blueprint for the political
transition to democracy, military experts initially dealt
with the role of the various armed forces leading up
to the election. Three issues dominated the first set of
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formal talks held in March 1993: the establishment of
some joint military mechanism to facilitate governance
in a climate of continued political violence, ending the
guerrilla training of the liberation armies in neighboring
countries, and the creation of a transitional National
Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) to assist the peace
process.30 Meetings later that year turned to the critical
issues of integration and the future arrangement of the
country’s armed forces.
Needless to say, the numerous bilateral discussions
were not always smooth or without controversy.
Nevertheless, they produced a number of extremely
important results. First, they established the framework for the integration of the various formations following the April 1994 elections. Second, a number of
decisions were reached regarding the future national
military, e.g., that it would adopt an essentially defensive strategic posture and would be comprised of a
relatively small professional core force with a larger
part-time reserve force. Of note, the SADF was able to
insist that the future armed forces would maintain a
high degree of performance (professional) standards
and technology and that pre-1994 military regulations
would remain in effect during the transition, thus
guaranteeing a certain degree of continuity and
institutional hegemony. Third, both sides agreed to
a general amnesty for all military forces for past acts
and human rights violations.31 Fourth, these series of
talks granted considerable domestic and international
legitimacy to the subsequent military. Obviously,
the MK’s participation and concurrence with the
arrangements were critical in this regard. Finally, the
face-to-face interactions encouraged trust between the
former enemies. This spirit of cooperation and relative
good will would facilitate future efforts at working
out the more specific organizational details. I now turn
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to the post-1994 election evolution of the South African
National Defence Force (SANDF).
As argued earlier, the pre-1994 negotiations played
a vital role in establishing the very rough outline of the
new SANDF. While coming to agreement on certain
aspects of the armed forces, military and civilian
decisionmakers still had to determine the more exact
institutional details of the transformation after the
election. Questions regarding the integration process,
future personnel policies, budgetary commitments,
and the fate of the South African arms industry all
needed to be answered.
Unfortunately, time and space considerations preclude an exhaustive treatment of the initial postelection period. Instead, I will focus on four components of the SANDF institutional design to demonstrate how policymakers sought to balance the dual
challenges of defending the fledgling democracy from
internal and external threats, and promoting a new
conception of the political system and national
community.
The four elements are: constitutional civil-military
relations, military doctrine and operational strategy, force design and structure, (including policies
of integration and rationalization), and “representativeness,” educational, and training programs. This is
by no means an exhaustive list of the organizational
features that would require clarification. Nonetheless,
they are important measures of the armed forces and
certainly influence both combat effectiveness and
future trajectory of the military in South Africa.
Before focusing on issues of institutional design,
a few words about the decisionmaking process are
warranted. By all accounts, the post-1994 restructuring process was extremely open or transparent.
Conscious of the Apartheid-era secrecy and the
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militaristic total strategy that shaped decisionmaking
during that period, former SADF and ANC/MK
leaders opened up the policy process to academics,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other
civil society associations, in part, to enhance the new
defense establishment’s legitimacy. The solicitation
of outside input also helped to incorporate wider
intellectual ideas and social viewpoints. Working
groups were convened, and public comments on
draft White Papers were welcomed and in some
cases incorporated into the final draft. Obviously,
while NGOs and other groups offered important
contributions to broader, more macro-level aspects of
defense policy, the former members of the SADF were
able to dominate the more technical level questions of
tactics, weapons systems, etc., due to their expertise.
However,
The most notable feature of the (Defence) Review
process was the extent of civil society participation.
The Working Group deliberately went beyond the
narrow concept of NGOs as those organisations which
are geared to political and policy interventions, to
involve organisations such as religious and sporting
groups, and to get out to the provinces…What is clear,
however, is that the DoD found a successful formula
for incorporating civil society into the defence
policymaking process without compromising its own
interests and professionalism.32

This transparency not only helped to enhance the
nascent military’s legitimacy, it was also a significant
indicator of the character of the new South Africa.
Finally, two core documents were the product of
these extensive deliberations—The White Paper on
National Defence for the Republic of South Africa33 and the
South African Defence Review.34
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Constitutional Civil-Military Relations.
After the Constitutional Court rejected a first draft
of the permanent constitution in 1996 on the ground
that it did not fully comply with the 34 principles
outlined in the Interim Constitution, a revised version
was submitted by the Constituent Assembly and
subsequently certified by the court as valid.35 The
new Constitution “outlines the principles, structure,
responsibilities and relationships which are necessary
to secure democratic civil-military relations. Civilmilitary relations refer to the hierarchy of authority
between the Executive, Parliament and the armed
forces, and to civil supremacy over these forces.”36
This fairly generic assertion of civilian control
highlights a dramatic shift in the relationship between
civilians and the military in South Africa. During the
Apartheid-era, the exigencies of White rule led to the
expansion and increased autonomy of the security
apparatus—including the SADF. This institution
determined internal and external security operations,
planning, budgeting, and strategic decisions, just to
name a few.
According to the new Constitution, the Parliament,
through the Minister of Defence, is the ultimate
authority for all military matters during peacetime.
The Chief of the SANDF, appointed by the President, is
responsible for executive command of the armed forces
subject to the direction of the Minister of Defence. In
the case of hostilities (war) or internal emergencies,
the President may declare a state of “national defence”
and, thus, direct the SANDF in accordance with the
Constitution. In these instances, the President must
immediately inform the Parliament of the reasons
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for the use of the SANDF. Three broad criteria justify
this action: defense of the Republic, compliance with
international obligations, or the maintenance of
internal law and order.37
A second feature of the Constitution involves
the establishment of Joint Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Defence (JPSCD). Modeled on the
Committee on Defense of the German Bundestag,
this Parliamentary organ has the authority to investigate “the functioning, finance, armaments, and
preparedness” of the SANDF.38 Made up of 36 permanent and alternative members, the JPSCD has increasingly influenced the direction and policies of the
military. As might be expected, the members of the
committee are hampered by a lack of expertise and
knowledge with regard to security issues. The national
government has invested considerable resources and
energy to augment their proficiency through oversees
trips for committee members, as well as visits and
briefings at local defense industries. However, despite
this handicap and the military’s continued cultural
legacy of independence,
Civil society as reflected in the JPSCD has registered a
number of victories in the tussle over turf that mirrors
the wider struggles to define civil-military relations
in the new democracy. The JPSCD, despite its various
liabilities, has established credentials in a manner
inconceivable during the years of total strategy, and
the armed forces have accepted that they are required
to explain their behavior along a range of previously
sacrosanct issues.39

Finally, a civilian Secretary of Defence was established
within the Ministry of Defence to provide policy
guidance to the Chief of the SANDF and his staff in
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determining the policy direction, budgeting, and
management of the armed forces.
Military Doctrine and Operational Strategy.
The primary function of a state’s military is to
defend its territory, citizens, and institutions from
external threats. Often this may include operations
against internal enemies. Increasingly, the SADF was
employed against such enemies, most notably the
ANC and the MK. In their struggle against the White
regime, however, the various liberation armies were
based and operated mostly out of foreign territories
(Angola, Botswana, or Mozambique), and in response,
the SADF engaged in numerous attacks and border
incursions against these bases, as well as destabilization efforts aimed at coercing the foreign governments
into withdrawing their support for the insurgents.
Justified in large part by the claim that they
alone were fighting to keep Sub-Saharan Africa from
becoming communist, the SADF adopted an offensive military doctrine. With the end of the Cold War
and the death of Apartheid, the official conception of
a capitalist South Africa surrounded by hostile communist actors evaporated. To use academic jargon,
South Africa’s “strategic environment,” changed dramatically; and in many observers’ opinions, the change
was overwhelmingly positive.
Consistent with both the pre-1994 negotiations and
the White Paper,40 the Defence Review41 states that the
SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation
and posture.42 Although not currently confronted
with any conventional threats, the first and most
important mission for the SANDF is the protection
of the state and its people against external military
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threats. Relying on the doctrine of conventional
deterrence, the Defence Review declares that South
Africa will maintain a defense capability sufficiently
credible to deter potential aggressors. However, in the
absence of existential threats, exactly what constitutes
a credible capability remains vague. Nonetheless, two
crucial dimensions of the new military strategy were
particularly noteworthy. First, the very conception
of national security has been expanded beyond more
traditional conceptions to now embrace political,
economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Second,
South African security will be pursued through
multilateral mechanisms such as regional security
institutions.
Partly due to the persuasive influence of academics
and NGOs, South Africa adopted an extremely broad
definition of national security. In addition to external
military threats, the SANDF recognizes that a panoply
of nonmilitary risks jeopardize South Africans.
According to the White Paper,
In the new South Africa national security is no
longer viewed as a predominantly military and
police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate
political, economic, social and environmental matters
. . . Security is an all-encompassing condition in
which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety;
participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy
the protection of fundamental rights; have access to
resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit
an environment which is not detrimental to their
health and well-being.43

While not automatically affecting the SANDF, the
emphasis on “human security” demonstrates the
commitment of the government to increased transparency of defense policymaking. In broad conceptual
terms, South Africa was on a different track.
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As the various points in the White Paper were
fleshed out during the Defence Review process, South
African military leaders were able to reintroduce a
certain level of “realist” thinking. This can be seen in
the Defence Review’s insistence that the SANDF stick to
its core function of territorial defense and its advocacy
for offensive tactics after being attacked.
Although acknowledging such secondary and tertiary duties as medical services, maritime services,
disaster relief, and election support, defense policymakers insisted that the SANDF not be utilized in such
a fashion unless absolutely necessary.44 Furthermore,
the size, structure, weaponry, equipment, and funding
of the SANDF are to be determined mainly on the basis
of its primary function. A tension, therefore, exists
between the new conception of human security and
the traditional thinking of military experts. To date,
this has not created insurmountable problems.45 Yet,
That two contradictory narratives can cohabit the
official defence documents of the post-apartheid era
can partly be attributed to the open, transparent and
consultative nature of the defence review process,
which has allowed all interested parties to contribute
their thoughts and views. Intrinsically, however,
it is a reflection of the fact that the South African
transition process has emerged through a process
of negotiation and reconciliation that has brought
opposing political cultures and identities together in
a process of accommodation.46

Concomitant with the conceptual shift towards
human security is a new reliance on regional
cooperation and multilateral institutions. If national
security is truly influenced by a range of issues such
as economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and the influx of illegal refugees, then
adequate solutions require cooperative actions.
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Chaos and instability threaten not only the country
of origin but also its neighbors. In contrast to the
Apartheid-era, South Africa intends to contribute to
regional stability and prosperity. In fact, Pretoria may
be uniquely qualified to lead many of these missions
due to the existence of the most highly trained and wellequipped military in Southern Africa. Also, since one
of the main objectives of post-apartheid South African
defense policy was to break out of its past isolation
and rejoin its regional community, regional cooperation and peacekeeping, etc., offered a significant
means for South Africa’s political rehabilitation.
Significantly, peacekeeping efforts remain a primary
mission for the South African armed forces.
Force Design: Structure, Policies of Integration, and
Rationalization.
As touched upon earlier, the first significant
organizational challenge was the integration of the
Statutory and Non-Statutory Forces into a single
corporate body. Following this logistical headache,
the second step was to downsize or rationalize the
armed forces into a more cost-effective configuration.
Finally, politicians and policymakers outlined the
explicit goal of making this institution representative
of South Africa through a variety of personnel policies
including affirmative action, equal opportunity, and
the management of diversity (issues that will be addressed in the next section).
A thorough examination of the dynamics of
the integration process is beyond the scope of this
monograph. Succinctly, in the course of the pre-1994
election negotiations, SADF and MK leaders agreed to
set up assembly areas (AAs) into which the scattered,
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unconventional soldiers of the liberation armies would
relocate. There, they would be disarmed and registered.
Subsequently, decisions regarding appropriate
rank, skill level, required training, new posts, etc.,
would be made in anticipation of the pending fusion.
Former SADF leaders were justifiably apprehensive
as this process got underway. Most importantly, they
were adamant that there not be a drop-off in the professional standards of the future armed forces. This
position dominated the negotiations and ensured that
White officers and soldiers would retain, at least initially, a privileged position. A commitment to professionalism was also a vital element of their organizational culture.
As a result, a program of bridging training was
designed to help overcome the gap in technical and
skill levels between the professional SADF and the
more egalitarian culture and guerrilla tactics of the
liberation armies. Other issues that confounded the
process were incomplete and/or inaccurate rosters of
the various NSF units, delays in reporting by soldiers,
and confusion as to rank equivalence.
Despite the invaluable assistance of a British
Military Advisory and Technical Training Team
(BMATT), considerable resentment between White
and Black South Africans and numerous logistical
problems plagued the process. Nonetheless, the
integration phase of the restructuring odyssey was
declared essentially complete in March 2003, almost 5
years behind schedule.47 With far more soldiers than
actually needed, a rationalization process through
which unskilled, unmotivated, and redundant soldiers
would be demobilized followed the integration of
forces.
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In terms of force configuration, South Africa
has adopted a plan that calls for the creation and
maintenance of a small, professional “core” force
accompanied by a much larger part-time or reserve
force.48 Referred to in the Defence Review as the “one
force concept,”49 the goal is to ensure sufficient active
duty forces readily deployable, with a larger reserve
capable of rapid mustering if and when a more
substantial threat arises.
Despite the fact that southern Africa is a “region of
allies” and the absence of any conventional threats in
the short- and medium-term, the core force is expected
to respond to the following defensive contingencies:
invasions (seen as unlikely); limited neutralizing
attacks (seen as unlikely); internal military threats to
the constitutional order (seen as a low probability);
raids (seen as a low probability); blockades; attacks on
embassies, ships, and aircraft (seen as a moderate-high
probability); and law enforcement of marine resources
and maritime zone (seen as a low probability).50 Based
on this “threat-independent” analysis, the SANDF
must take advantage of its favorable geography,
be balanced and flexible, maintain a relatively high
level of technological sophistication, and emphasize
jointness between the services.
Not listed above, the deployment of SANDF
units for peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and
peacekeeping duties is acknowledged as a much
more likely scenario. South Africa, all its integration
and rationalization pains notwithstanding, is still
the predominant military power in the region. Also,
South African leaders have explicitly recognized
their country’s obligation to participate in regional
cooperative defense systems.
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In keeping with the expanded definition of security,
policymakers emphasize the importance of combating
the consequences of underdevelopment, illiteracy, disease, and environmental degradation. Coupled with
the destabilizing effects of internal chaos (civil war),
these issues are currently the most proximate threat
to South Africa’s national security. Regional political
and security institutions, such as the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) with its Organ on
Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), are the
most effective mechanisms for countering these risks.
“Representativeness,” Educational and Training
Programs.
In addition to the more traditional aspects of
military institutional design, South Africa has
embraced a number of very important personnel
policies. Reiterated in almost all official documents
and by governmental spokesmen, the policies focus
on the objective of creating a representative and
democratic armed force.51 As will be argued below,
South African political and military leaders recognize
that the new SANDF must distance itself from its
racial, exclusive past in order to encourage the organization’s legitimacy. Also, because the pursuit of these
policies involves significant trade-offs in terms of
combat and cost effectiveness, the motivations behind
them are worth considering in detail.
The promotion of “representativeness” was one of
the fundamental principles upon which the new South
African military would be constructed. According to
Philip Frankel,
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From the beginning of negotiations over the
military pact, all the military formations agreed (in
principle, if not detail) that if the new SANDF were to
become a functional component of the new political
dispensation it would have to be reengineered on
different social foundations. The membership and
internal power relations of the new armed forces, the
participants concurred, would have to represent the
multicultural diversity of the Republic, . . .52

If South Africans were to regard the military as
a legitimate governmental institution, considerable
demographic and social changes were required. The
military’s prior identification with Apartheid casts
a long shadow. Hence, one understands the vital
importance of the SADF-MK negotiations and the
plans for integration.
However, there was a distinct fear that former
SADF soldiers would monopolize the most influential
positions within the armed forces; perhaps even
undermining the democratic transition process.
Furthermore, if the armed forces are to be combat
effective, a certain level of internal cohesion is
necessary.
In addition, it is hoped that restructuring the
National Defence Forces (NDF) in a more socially
comprehensive manner would enable the institution
to participate meaningfully in the vast economic and
social reconstruction projects. In the early stages of the
transition, South Africa would have to rely on military
units to assist in a variety of internal tasks, such as
crime prevention and border control. Finally, a fully
representative military would demonstrate (signal)
and promote the idea of a new pluralistic, multicultural South Africa.
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At least three policies were adopted to reach the
goal of representativeness. First, specific racial targets
were established. As integration and downsizing
reduced the size of the military, bridging training
and supplemental training programs were created
to ensure that the SANDF was able to retain enough
qualified Black soldiers and officers to counterbalance
the more highly trained White soldiers. Second, both
the White Paper and the Defence Review explicitly mandated that affirmative action policies should be
pursued.53 Unfortunately, there has been considerable
resistance among White officers to this program,
even though efforts have been made to learn from the
experience of the U.S. Department of Defense.54
Finally, equal opportunity is enshrined as a core
tenet of the new armed forces. In harmony with the
new Constitution, discrimination is absolutely prohibited. In many respects, South Africa’s equal protection
clause exceeds that of other militaries in that linguistic, religious, gender, and sexual orientation differences
are all legally guaranteed and protected.
The role of the SANDF in the democratization
process, however, is not limited solely to the policies
of representativeness. There has been a conscious decision to use the armed forces to educate both officers
and soldiers in civics, the ideals of representative
democracy and the primacy of civilian control over the
military.
Currently, the Defence College in Pretoria offers
a 4-month course on new civic-democratic values.
This promotes the transmission of these ideas into the
“military heartland—where the military is less cautious
in exposing its top leadership to ostensibly subversive
civilian influence.”55 Political education is not limited
to the officer class. Both full-time and part-time soldiers
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are required to take courses on this subject. Obviously,
the crux of their training is in combat-related duties and
responsibilities. However, to encourage both military
professionalism and civic skills, the Defense Review
states that a six-module curriculum on Civic Education
was to be phased in beginning in 1998 (in addition to
classes on International Humanitarian Law).56
The six modules are: key features of the democratic
political process, the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, civil-military relations, the law of armed conflict, multicultural diversity, and military professionalism.57 Although a topic of intense interest, the ramifications of these education programs have yet to manifest
themselves.
Summing up the efforts made by South African
political and military leaders, one sees the central
influence of both political and military imperatives
in the post-1994 design of civil-military institutions.
Decisionmakers were compelled to construct a set of
institutions that satisfied both concerns of security and
the needs of democratic civil control. Furthermore,
planners sought to utilize the armed forces for purposes
that exceeded these more limited objectives (and
functions) associated with defense in order to support
the wider transition towards multiracial democracy.
Consistent with the observations made of the postcommunist militaries, historical legacies, political
considerations, and social factors played a crucial role
in the decisionmaking process.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1949-56
Few would disagree with the claim that Nazi
Germany represented one of the 20th century’s
most notorious rogue states. Beginning with his
legal assumption of political power in 1933, Adolph
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Hitler and the National Socialist Party embarked
on a domestic and international project that would
culminate 12 years later in the complete destruction
of the German Nazi state, the almost total devastation
of the German economy, and a military occupation by
four former enemy powers of all German territory.
Massive round-ups of Nazi officials coincided with
international efforts geared towards the economic
and social stabilization of the country. Various forms
of retribution, most prominently war tribunals,
awaited many of the perpetrators. Previously exiled,
imprisoned, and/or complicit Germans also began to
cooperate with the occupiers in the formidable process
of rebuilding what was left of Germany. Certainly,
time and space considerations prohibit an exhaustive
treatment of these endeavors.
Following detailed and exhaustive deliberations by
the Parliamentary Council throughout the winter 194849, the Basic Law was signed on May 23, 1949, and the
first free elections to the national parliament in 16 years
were held on August 14, 1949. While still under partial
control of the three occupying powers (France, Great
Britain, and the United States), the Federal Republic of
Germany was created. Of significance, the Basic Law
made no provisions for a German military beyond the
banal claim that Germany, like all states, had the rights
of self-defense. Few were willing to raise the prospect
of new German armed forces, let alone outline a
timetable for their creation or detail the specifics of
civil-military relations. It would take another 6 years
before most of these details would get resolved.
During this period (1949-56), German military and
political planners struggled with the dual challenges of
designing a military force and civil-military institutions
capable of both satisfying Germany’s core security
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needs and contributing to and encouraging the nascent
democratic transition process. Similar to the earlier case
study on South Africa, I will focus on four components
of the intended design to demonstrate the importance
of these twin challenges. The four critical elements of
the organizational structure are: (1) constitutional civilmilitary relations, (2) military doctrine and operational
strategy, (3) force design-troop configuration and
operational command and control, and (4) internal
regulations or Innere Führung.
Constitutional Civil-Military Relations.
As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the
initial deliberations on German rearmament took
place at an international level (in the context to the
proposed European Defense Community [EDC]) and
dealt primarily with the structure of the military units.
In Germany, attention turned to the problematic issue
of civilian control of the military. Konrad Adenauer
and his military experts had designed the various
elements of the Bundeswehr structure with one eye on
the domestic and one on the international level. With
reference to civilian control, however, domestic actors
were to exclusively settle the matter.
Three important decisions serve to demonstrate
the extent to which Adenauer’s plans would require
the input and consent of domestic opposition, most
notably the Social Democratic Party (SPD): the debate
on who should control the armed forces in peace and
war, the institutionalization of the Bundestag Security
Committee as a permanent constitutional organ with
full investigative powers, and the establishment of the
Wehrbeauftragter (parliamentary defense ombudsman).
With reference to control of the army, Adenauer
understandably preferred that the Chancellor retain
33

control of the military during both peace and war.
The SPD was adamant that the Ministry of Defense be
under the permanent control of the Bundestag. Finally,
the Free Democratic Party (FDP) advocated that the
President control the armed forces. Without going
into the details, the final outcome was a “historic”
compromise solution that not only settled the debate
on control, but also on the Wehrbeauftragter and the
Bundestag Security Committee. It was agreed that the
Defense Minister would be commander in chief during
peacetime, but answerable to the Bundestag. During
war or national emergency (to be declared by the
President), the Chancellor would assume the position
of commander in chief. The SPD backed off its demand
for parliamentary control of the Defense Ministry in
exchange for the creation of the Wehrbeautragter and
the incorporation of the Bundestag Security Committee as a permanent constitutional office.
The SPD had been calling for the establishment of
the Wehrbeauftragter for a number of years. In essence,
the office acted as an ombudsman before whom
soldiers could bring complaints and grievances. It was
also in charge of overseeing the implementation of
Innere Führung at the unit level.58
The Bundestag Security Committee was not new,
however, and had been in existence since 1952. During
the early years of remilitarization, both the governing
parties and important SPD leaders recognized the
need to involve the opposition in the creation of a
German army. Memories of Weimar, during which the
Social Democrats abstained from active participation
in military matters, weighed heavily on the decision
to create a mechanism for informing the opposition
of government positions and soliciting their ideas on
various details of the rearmament process.
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Certainly some within the government did not
welcome the unnecessary meddling of the socialists.
Nonetheless, SPD military experts were to play a
critical role in these early years, and “they made an
enormous contribution to the success of the Federal
German civil-military relations through their work on
the political basis of the new army.”59 With the compromise of 1955-56, the Bundestag Security Committee
became a permanent constitutional organ with full
investigative powers.
Military Doctrine and Operational Strategy.
German defense planners, as much as the
other allies, struggled with crafting a meaningful
warfighting strategy in the new and revolutionary
nuclear age. With so many uncertainties, it is hardly
surprising that German decisionmakers would rely on
the traditional operational concepts developed prior to
and during World War II. In addition, the potential,
and increasingly likely, use of tactical nuclear weapons
presented both a political and military dilemma for
Bonn, Germany. With the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) strategy progressively more
reliant on tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for
conventional weakness relative to the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, German leaders had to devise
a way to prevent German territory from becoming a
nuclear battlefield. Few were willing to accept the
argument that their, and Western Europe’s, security
was enhanced by a strategy that almost certainly
guaranteed the nuclear devastation of the better part
of the Federal Republic’s population and homeland.
Operational planning began in earnest in October
1950 at the Himmerod cloister. As was the case with
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other aspects of German remilitarization, numerous
questions were raised as to how much of the German
military past should be retained. The Himmeroder
Denkschrift, in terms of operations and tactics, was very
traditional. One must keep in mind that most of the
military planners present had been educated in a very
conventional, conservative manner.
“The operational planning in Himmerod envisioned
a classical concept of a stable central front with the
possibility of a flanking counteroffensive out of its
defensive position.”60 Self-contained German units up
to the corps level would be heavily mechanized and
extremely mobile. Expectedly, little consideration was
given to the role of nuclear weapons. When they were
addressed, most military planners simply viewed
them as “stronger artillery.” Part of the problem or inability to comprehend their revolutionary implications
rested in the traditional strong separation between
politics and the military.
Herein rested the problem for the Bundeswehr with
atomic weapons, also weapons of shorter range, in
the first place they must be understood politically
as a means of deterrence and this possibility was
not examined, as “stronger artillery,” however,
they could act as a compensation for conventional
inferiority and with them make a military victory
possible despite this (conventional) disadvantage.61

These early ideas were set aside as negotiations
began in February 1951 over the EDC. During these
meetings, little attention was devoted towards
developing an integrated operational strategy. Clearly,
political considerations had to be worked out; once
again postponing complicated technical issues to a
future date.
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In October 1953, with U.S. nuclear superiority still
intact, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved
National Security Council (NSC) directive 162/2. In
essence, NSC-162/2 laid out the policy of “massive
retaliation” in which the United States promised to
respond to a Soviet invasion by any means necessary.
Officially titled the “New Look,” the policy of reliance
on nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, had
profound implications for NATO allies, including the
Federal Republic of Germany.
With the adoption of the 1954 New Look, the United
States was not only increasing the reliance on the
deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear power, but was also
forcing its allies to associate themselves with nuclear
strategy…So the timing of the New Look meant
that it turned into a means not only for shifting the
balance of American forces from the conventional to
the nuclear but also for instituting a nuclear bias into
the basic structure of NATO forces that thereafter
became extremely difficult to dislodge.62

The timing of the announcement coincided with
the early phases of the German rearmament. In 1953,
and the first half of 1954, genuine efforts were still
underway to rearm Germany within the confines of the
EDC. One of the concessions the German government
made to obtain approval for its military contribution
was the willingness to forgo the development of
nuclear weapons. Devising operational strategies and
tactics during this time, therefore, involved primarily
conventional weapons and maneuvers. As indicated
above, German military planners emphasized mobility and heavy armaments. In fact, at the February
1952 NATO Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, German
military experts tried, unsuccessfully, to change the
operational ideas of its allies. General Adolf Heusinger
37

argued that U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) strategies
were too static and not mobile enough. These ideas
were rejected on the grounds that conventional forces
were not sufficient to support such an offensive
orientation.63
With the failure of the French parliament to ratify
the EDC Treaty at the end of August 1954, the idea of
a European army was officially laid to rest. In an effort
to determine how to approach German rearmament
outside the EDC framework, a Nine-Power Summit
was held in London, UK, in September 1954, culminating in the London Agreement. The agreement included the following provisions: the Federal Republic
would be admitted to NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); Bonn promised to abstain from the
production of nuclear, biological, or chemical (ABC)
weapons, strategic aircraft, and long-range artillery;
and Britain agreed to maintain four army divisions
on the Continent. These conditions were formally
drafted into the Paris (France) Treaty of 1954, and after
significant early opposition from France, Britain, and
the German SPD; all nine countries ratified the Treaty.
The German Bundestag ratified the Treaty on February 27, 1955, and the President signed it into law on
March 24, 1955.
The practical consequences of this sudden shift
from potential EDC participation to actual NATO
membership for German military planning were
significant. Not only did it free policymakers from
numerous constraints on organizational design, it
directly linked German conceptions of operational
strategy to those of the United States. By the end of
1954, the Supreme Allied Commander - Europe
(SACEUR) anticipated that the role of the 12 German
divisions in the atomic age should be to act as “an
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organic component of the allied defense wall,” behind
which the troop concentrations of the aggressor
would be destroyed with “new weapons.”64 This role,
however, was not exactly what the Germans had in
mind.
German political and military leaders were, for
obvious reasons, concerned with the defense of German territory as far east as possible. Even the very
early opposition by the Social Democrats was based,
in part, on the fact that allied defense of German territory would only begin in earnest at the Rhine River.
Mirroring the criticism of the SPD, one German exgeneral and member of a veterans’ organization that
opposed rearmament within a Western alliance, the
Militärpolitische Forum (MPF), wrote:
The main burden of the battles would be carried by
the Germans, who naturally would also have the most
interest in the defense, while the French, English and
American generals’ first priority would be to bring
their troops undamaged back behind the Rhine.65

Partly in response to these domestic criticisms but
primarily out of military logic, military planners early
and stridently promoted the strategy of “forward
defense.”
Therefore, it was to be expected that on becoming a
member of NATO, German military experts in charge
of operational development were preoccupied with
two issues: the role of tactical nuclear weapons, and
line of defense. The question of tactical nuclear weapons and their place in German and NATO strategy
was to be decided by the United States, with the
Germans exerting little successful influence.
The line of defense, however, depended directly
on the German armed forces. In the opinion of the
United States and NATO, a forward strategy required
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a significant number of German ground forces. NATO
planners determined that a total of 30 divisions (of
which 12 were to be German) would be required to
implement the forward strategy. In their absence, or
until they were deployed en mass, Germany would
remain susceptible to a conventional offensive invasion. NATO forces, only capable of presenting a thin
line of defense approximately in the middle of West
Germany, would have to fall back as the invading
Soviet (Warsaw Pact) forces were attacked with tactical
nuclear weapons.
Therein rested the crux of the problem for German
leaders. Although they understood the probable chaos
and destruction that tactical nuclear weapons would
entail, they were also finally convinced that a defense
of Western Europe and Germany was impossible
without such weaponry. Ironically, the security of the
Bundesrepublik rested on the assumption that most of it
would probably be destroyed before it could be saved.
Furthermore, German security relied on weapons
that German politicians and military personnel had
no control over. Forward defense, thus, offered two
benefits to Bonn: it increased the relevance of German
armed forces and offered a solution, albeit partial, to
the dilemma associated with tactical weapons. While
skepticism remained as to the feasibility of a forward
defense strategy, it was officially adopted essentially
for public consumption.66
Once coming to terms with the inevitable dependence on tactical weapons, German military planners
struggled to develop operational tactics for combat
during their use. Here again, their ideas were not in
concert with those of their allies. For the United States
and the UK, conventional combat during a nuclear
exchange would be most efficiently carried out on foot,
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thus the emphasis on infantry divisions as opposed to
tank divisions. German military planners, however,
argued in favor of the opposite—highly mobile,
mechanized operations. This disagreement would not
be decided until years later. In the meantime, the role
approved for conventional forces remained one of
reaction.
At a conference of NATO Defense Ministers in
October 1955, the SACEUR reaffirmed the importance
of conventional forces. Their responsibilities were,
. . . to prevent or defend that part of the Treaty area
that would be “overrun,” “occupied,” or “isolated.”
If a temporary occupation perhaps still takes place,
the subsequent “liberation” with the help of nuclear
and thermonuclear weapons was to be expected with
such great damage, the question of the necessary “so
called conventional armed forces” would answer
itself.67

In the end, the operational strategy was partially
consistent with the ideas espoused by German military
planners. NATO was willing to publicly adopt the
policy of forward defense. However, pending a
significant conventional build-up, this strategy was to
remain on paper. German efforts to promote mobile,
heavily mechanized operational tactics were less
successful. NATO forces were assumed to be too
few and the environmental and social conditions too
chaotic to allow for such maneuvers. With regard to
this aspect of structuring, military necessity seems
to be the driving force behind the outcome. It was obviously important to the German military itself that they
were allowed to push their preferred strategy and
tactics in intra-alliance negotiations.
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Force Design: Troop Configuration and Command
and Control.
As early as 1948, German military experts began
to consider the security requirements for a future
democratic Germany. Even then, these planners
were adamant that German troops not lose vital cohesiveness and morale by being deployed in national
units below the division level. German participation
in any future defense scheme must be on equal terms
(Gleichberechtigung) to those of other countries’ units,
and Germany must have full participation in the
associated political framework.68
A secret conference of German military experts in
October 1951 produced the Himmeroder Denkschrift. This
memo, heavily influenced by the traditional PrussianGerman thinking of its participants, advocated that
the main fighting unit remain the nationally homogeneous division. Furthermore, “German units should
be integrated on equal terms with German officers
receiving a corresponding (equal) position in an
integrated command-staff.”69 National divisions were
necessary to ensure maximum cohesiveness and
morale, both essential to military effectiveness. In
fact, the memo argued that Germany create nationally
homogeneous units up to the corps level, accompanied
by both tactical air and naval units.70
With the onset of the Korean War in the summer of
1950 and the mounting support of the United States,
France’s adamant opposition to German rearmament
started to wane. Realizing that the process may
advance without their involvement, French premier
René Pleven announced his plan for a European army
on October 24, 1950. In essence the European Defence
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Community (EDC) plan called for an integrated
European military formation;
The armed forces of participating countries should
not constitute a coalition army, something on the
model of NATO, instead the personnel and material
would be integrated “as completely as possible” into
the smallest possible units. There should be neither a
national German army nor a German general staff.71

While many high-ranking defense experts throughout
the West raised serious doubts about the plan, U.S.
and other Western leaders were anxious to rearm
Germany as quickly as possible and thus accepted the
idea. While Paris was less concerned with the Soviet
menace than were the Americans, French politicians
viewed the EDC as an opportunity to control German
remilitarization in a way that did not threaten French
security.
Recognizing that the Pleven Plan, as initially
laid out, was militarily suspect and unacceptable to
German negotiators, allied planners at the December
1950 NATO Brussels conference advanced the concept
of a national self-standing Kampfgruppen or “combat
teams.”72 Simply, the combat group was a brigade
in strength capable of independent action, roughly
5,000-6,000 soldiers. The French were still skeptical
and responded with the idea of a smaller regimental
combat group. In any case, France succumbed to
U.S. and British pressure, and the French Council of
Ministers approved the compromise on December 6,
1950.
Despite Anglo-American support for the EDC and
France’s acquiescence on the size of national units,
Germany reacted negatively to the compromise plan
for combat teams, regimental or otherwise. Besides
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the considerable opposition among German and
Allied military experts as to the functional utility of
these units, German public opinion was increasingly
critical of the Pleven Plan and its discriminatory
treatment of the Federal Republic of Germany. In
November 1950, the Adenauer government and the
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
(CDU/CSU) had suffered electoral losses, and many
within the ruling coalition viewed this as a rejection
of the rearmament plan. Significantly, SPD chief Kurt
Schumacher also spoke out forcefully against the Plan,
capturing the two primary concerns:
Denouncing it as “the murder of the European idea,”
Schumacher said it would make a German contingent
little more than a “foreign legion.” He argued that
it made no sense militarily because the integration
of units at the battalion level was inefficient. Even
worse, it would mean that the Germans were giving
up their own national interests to serve the Allies.
“Nothing could be more foolhardy,” he revealingly
declared, “than sacrificing the defense of one’s own
country to the interests of others.73

As a result of these factors, Adenauer rejected the
compromise. However, rather than give up on the
plan completely, the Chancellor agreed to two sets
of negotiations: one, to commence in January 1951 in
Petersberg (a suburb outside of Bonn), with the Allied
High Commissioners to discuss possible political changes that may accompany a German contribution to
Western defense; and the other, beginning in February
1951, in Paris, to work out the more specific military
details of the EDC.
While negotiations in Paris were proceeding,
German military planners themselves were actively
engaged in designing a new organizational outline
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for the German division. At first they developed a
design for a national division to be deployed within an
integrated military called Division 51. This plan had to
be scraped, however, as a result of French objections
and the EDC negotiations.
As the EDC talks became bogged down over the
issue of unit size, etc., negotiators decided to postpone
technical matters until the more general political
questions of the EDC treaty had been decided. With
France’s refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty in August
1954, German military planners were freed from these
constraints and once again developed a detailed design
for a national division—Division 54. Division 54 was
a heavily mechanized and mobile unit configured to
operate in a nuclear battlefield.
Thus by late 1954, the debate shifted away from the
appropriate size of a national unit to the question of
type. German planners advocated that German ground
forces, to consist of approximately 500,000 men in 12
divisions, be almost exclusively heavy mechanized
panzer divisions. Allied planners, especially from the
United States and the UK, disagreed, arguing that
combat operations under conditions of nuclear war
would most effectively be carried out on foot. They,
therefore, insisted that German soldiers be deployed
primarily in infantry divisions.
The debate went back and forth and ultimately
became moot when German planners acknowledged
extensive logistical and financial problems and
postponed full mobilization for a number of years. Of
note, the extensive negotiations in the Bundeswehr’s
formative phase demonstrate that German military
leaders were adamant that German units be combat
effective. In this regard, they were successful on
the question of size—the nationally homogeneous
division.
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Innere Führung or Internal Guidance and Regulations.
Work on the internal regulations of the Bundeswehr
began almost as early as the initial decision to rearm.
Innere Führung, loosely defined as internal guidance or
inner leadership, is one of the most novel aspects of the
post-World War II German armed forces. Succinctly,
Innere Führung was designed to assure the domestic
population that the new armed forces would not
become a state within a state and, instead, foster the
ideals of democracy, respect for human and individual
rights, and rule of constitutional law.
These policies were designed, in part, so that the
armed forces could act as a quasi-civil society for the
nascent German democracy. Military veterans of the
past totalitarian state, as well as young conscripts,
would be trained and educated within a military
organization fundamentally different from those of the
past (as well as most other contemporary militaries.)
Not only did its design and implementation have little
to do with combat efficiency, a number of Germany’s
top military leaders and allied defense experts openly
questioned its utility and possible consequences.
At its core, the goal of Innere Führung was to create
or promote the ideal of “StaatsBürger im Uniform” or
“citizen in uniform.”
Innere Führung is time and time again very
contentious. It has been so from the beginning. It
has the goal of reforming the military from within
with the assistance of the ideals of civilian citizens in
military service, in order to adequately/appropriately
integrate it in a democratic-parliamentary state
structure and to maintain it finally in fundamental
accordance with the pluralistic diversity of an open
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society…The military should no longer stand against
the citizenry. Citizens in uniform (should) want to
conquer or give up the military mind, the subservient
spirit, the oppression, the injustice and create a civil
constitution within the military.74

In what was explicitly designed to be a revolutionary
break with the Prussian-German militaristic past,
the reforms associated with this goal were aimed at
preventing a repetition of past abuses and creating
a military that mirrored the society it was to defend.
(Interestingly, this objective mirrors later efforts in
post-Apartheid South Africa).
In the past, the strict separation and isolation of
the military from both the German state and society
had created what many referred to as a state within
a state. As the German political community struggled
throughout its history with the transition to a stable
democracy, the military often acted in ways that either
retarded or out-right reversed the intermittent gains
by pro-democratic forces. In the post-World War II
period, a number of important military and political
leaders recognized that drastic reforms were necessary
to assure the domestic population that a new German
military would not return to such behavior.
Foremost among those committed to this radical
departure from the past was Count Wolf von Baudissin.
Baudissin’s influence on the inner structure of the new
German military began at the Himmerod Conference
during the second half of 1950 when he was appointed
to work on the committee responsible for matters
related to the “Innere Gefüge” (inner structure) of the
new army. In May 1951, Baudissin officially joined the
Dienstelle Blank.75 Placed in charge of the Wehrwesen
office, he and his department were to assist in the
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drafting of new military legislation and plan the inner
structure of the German contribution to the EDC.
In terms of mission, Baudissin’s reform effort was
not necessarily unprecedented. Attempts to reform the
German military were proposed numerous times; with
Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau’s
reforms of the Prussian military in the wake of its
defeat at the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte perhaps
the most famous. Realizing that a new military had
to be acceptable (legitimate) both domestically and
internationally, Baudissin and other reformers argued
that future German soldiers must be thoroughly
integrated within the society they were being asked to
defend (the most effective means would be the subject
of considerable debate). Due to drastic changes both
in the nature of technology and warfare, and political
and social conditions of 20th century society, soldiers
must receive new types of military training as well as a
new sense of purpose.
In regards to the second matter, a new emphasis
on political and ideological education was necessary.
Abandoning the barracks training and endless drilling
of the past, military education was to be designed
around the core objective of preparing Germans to
become “political soldiers.” Deterring war and conflict
was first and foremost. “Indeed, the reformer argued
that nuclear-era soldiers were faced with the paradox
that they would have failed in their mission if forced to
implement their deadly skills.”76
Furthermore, soldiers must be educated in the
basics of the new West German political and social
system. Utilizing both internal regulations and
military universities, both conscripts and professional
soldiers would constantly be exposed to the primacy of
parliamentary control, the importance of legal rights,
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and the fact that the Bundeswehr was to reflect the
political and cultural diversity present in the Federal
Republic. In addition, soldiers were to possess the
same democratic rights and obligations as their fellow
civilians. Beyond the soldiers themselves, the reforms
of Innere Führung had an added importance.
The future army would also have an important
educational role in society. Baudissin hoped that
the armed forces would win young people for a
united Europe and “lead them to the new state (the
Federal Republic).” Such purposes reflected his selfproclaimed kinship with the Prussian reformers of
the early nineteenth century and their belief that
the army should make the subjects of the sovereign
into citizens of the nation. The new army would be a
school of Europe.77

As might be expected, the plans for reforming the
German armed forces were meet with considerable
internal and external opposition. Domestically,
numerous opponents to military reforms, including
both experts within the government and ex-officers in
veterans’ organizations, expressed considerable skepticism as to the utility of reforms and their prospects for success. Criticism seemed to center on two
areas of concern: first, the reformers were unwilling to
acknowledge the progressive nature of the past which
was, in part, responsible for the high quality of past
performance, and/or second, that the military reforms
would threaten combat effectiveness and morale.78
The reforms envisioned in Innere Führung were not
only revolutionary for the German military, in many
respects, these changes were far more progressive than
any of the internal rules and regulations in the allied
armed forces. With membership in NATO, the most
meaningful criticism would come increasingly from
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the United States. Of note, the U.S. military’s primary
concern was with military efficacy. Baudissin visited
the United States in 1955 and was disappointed to
find out that the United States had little use for Innere
Führung. “They simply wanted German soldiers—
as numerous, competent, and rapidly mobilized as
possible,” he complained. “The last thing they wanted
to hear was how radically ‘new’ their German partners would look and behave.”79
Similar to subsequent developments in the future
democratic South Africa, political and military imperatives were crucial factors for German political
and defense planners in the design of their armed
forces. Whereas considerably more attention was paid
to the military aspects of the Bundeswehr due to the
heightened threat level accompanying the emerging
Cold War, decisionmakers were also conscious of the
need to guarantee civilian control and respect for the
democratic constitution. Finally, the German armed
forces were seen as an essential mechanism for the
construction and maintenance of a democratic society.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATE AND NATIONBUILDING EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ,
AND ELSEWHERE
While it has been over 8 years since the initial military defeat of the Taliban, the reconstruction of Afghanistan is still in its very early stages. That has not
prevented a flurry of ideas, plans, agreements, and
criticisms. Unfortunately, early optimism has given
way to grave concern as counterinsurgency operations
against the Taliban and efforts to develop the Afghan
national armed forces have proven far more complicated than initially planned. It is therefore far beyond
the scope of this analysis (and perhaps premature) to
50

present an exhaustive list of the successes and failures
to date. Also, the situation in Iraq, although increasingly hopeful, remains tentative. Therefore, the purpose
of this brief section is to highlight a few, very important aspects of the military restructuring in the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa as the two
emerged from their violent rogue past and attempted
to rejoin the international community. Of note, some of
these policies, such as vetting of soldiers and officers
and political and civic education, have been implemented in both countries. While it will take many years
(perhaps generations) before the fruits of these efforts
will be realized, it is not too early to introduce these
ideas and have government planners, in-county policymakers, and area specialists evaluate whether they
are appropriate, and if not how they can be adjusted.
Transparency.
Although the process of German remilitarization
initially took place under considerable secrecy, once
the decision had been reached, deliberations became
much more open. South African defense planning also
placed a high premium on openness and actively solicited ideas and comments from a wide spectrum of
South African society. Given the totalitarian past of
both Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers should avoid
charges of hyper-secrecy and attempt to assure these
societies that the future armed forces are truly theirs.
Legislative Monitoring Mechanisms.
Permanent institutional mechanisms should be
created to guarantee that opposition leaders and members of parliament would be active participants in the
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creation and structuring of civil-military institutions.
This will not only ease their approval of funding and
deployment, but also ensure that they share the responsibility for the armed forces.
Representative Armed Forces.
Either through limited conscription or proactive
recruitment and personnel policies, efforts should be
made to ensure that the armed forces mirror the political community they are being asked to defend. This
enhances the military’s legitimacy and eases suspicions that the organization will unfairly target specific
religious, ethnic or regional groups. Also, while more
systematic analysis needs to be done on the possible
sociological effects of military service, this may offer a
significant contribution to the process of nation-building in ethnically and religiously divided countries.
Political Education.
With representative democracy new to Iraq and
Afghanistan, training in democratic values, the importance of the rule of law, civilian primacy over the military, etc., are vital to the military’s continued willingness to respect and support legitimate civilian authority. Also, soldiers and officers will take these ideas and
values home with them and, one hopes, expose them
to a much wider audience. Given the relative importance of foreign military trainers and advisors, efforts
must also be made to ensure their education in and familiarity with democratic values.
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Vetting of Officers and Legitimate National Security
Responsibilities.
While not without some reluctance, both the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa employed
military leaders and personnel from their past. Officer
boards were created to make sure that potential officers
were politically acceptable and thus did not threaten
the transition process. In both cases this process was
important not only for the military itself but also society at large.
Despite the troubles and past abuses, many looked
back with some pride and were unwilling (or unable)
to accept the fact that anyone with prior military experience was still an enemy and/or had nothing to offer the future. Employing these prior service personnel
also makes good military sense in that it eases the burden of training an entirely new officer corps. Finally,
the military, as a professional organization, must be
an active participant in defining its country’s national
security strategy and given genuine policymaking responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
Designing democratic civil-military institutions is
obviously a formidable task. These efforts are all the
more difficult for states with authoritarian, militaristic
pasts. When this is coupled with social and economic
conditions characterized by inequality and enmity,
efforts at democratic state and nation-building may
prove elusive.
However, the political rehabilitation of Germany,
culminating in its current leadership role in European
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integration, demonstrates that successful democratic
state building is possible. While South Africa’s efforts
at both state and nation-building are still in their early
stages, qualified progress has been made. In both cases,
I argued that military institutions played a vital role.
On the surface, this is not a contentious or
innovative claim. However, when one analyzes in
detail the multifaceted approach to the design of civilmilitary institutions in these countries, one realizes
how extensive a role they were able to play. They were
constructed not only to respond to the countries’ core
security requirements, but also proactively designed to
promote democratic ideals and civic values and assist
in the reconstruction of the national community.
With combat operations still underway in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, it is hard to be too optimistic.
Furthermore, many confounding variables stand in
the way of successful democratic transitions in these
two countries. For example, without substantial and
prolonged international involvement and assistance,
prospects for democratic transition will not be as
hopeful in Iraq and Afghanistan as they were in
Germany and South Africa. Nonetheless, if one were
to ask informed observers in the summer of 1945 what
the prospects of a democratic Germany were, or the
same question in the late 1980s about South Africa,
most would have responded with similar skepticism
and perhaps scorn.
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